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Abstract
It is possible that powerful and potentially dangerous artificial intelligence (AI)
might be developed in the future (Russell et al., 2016) (Grace et al., 2017). An
Oracle is a design which aims to restrain the impact of a potentially dangerous
AI by restricting the agent to no actions besides answering questions (Babcock
et al., 2016). Unfortunately, most Oracles will be motivated to gain more control
over the world by manipulating users through the content of their answers, and
Oracles of potentially high intelligence might be very successful at this (Alfonseca
et al., 2016). In this paper we present two designs for Oracles which, even under
pessimistic assumptions, will not manipulate their users into releasing them and
yet will still be incentivised to provide their users with helpful answers. The first
design is the counterfactual Oracle – which choses its answer as if it expected
nobody to ever read it. The second design is the low-bandwidth Oracle – which is
limited by the quantity of information it can transmit.
1 Introduction
In recent years many have raised concerns about potential harms which might be caused by artificial
intelligence (Amodei et al., 2016), (Leike et al., 2017). The risk is that the aim of these agents would
not be aligned with human interests; this is especially tricky, as it is likely to be hard to control agents
with a very high level of intelligence (Yudkowsky, 2006), (Bostrom, 2014), (Everitt et al.).
One proposal for ensuring the safety of powerful AIs is to confine, (or ‘box’), the system – preventing
it from affecting the outside environment through any means other than answering questions over a
single output channel (Yampolskiy, 2012). This kind of boxed AI is referred to as an ‘Oracle’.
Unfortunately, even assuming the boxing is perfect (Babcock et al., 2017), meaning the AI can only
affect the world through its answers, there remains a problem: the AI can affect the world through its
answers. If the Oracle is sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled, it could plausibly trick or convince
its human controllers into giving it more control. This could (perhaps) be accomplished through
social manipulation, feigning benevolence, blackmail, bribery, or by answering questions which
subtly affect the world in ways which ultimately lead to the AI’s release (Armstrong et al., 2012).3
Though this risk is serious, it is difficult to model. For a start, at present we don’t know how powerful
AIs could become (Hutter, 2012) (Bostrom, 2014), when they might become powerful (Armstrong
et al., 2014), (Grace et al., 2017), and how best to model them if they do. It’s also not clear how easy
it is to manipulate humans through providing answers, or what level of precautions people would
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3There have been informal experiments where people played the rolls of ‘Oracle’ and ‘supervisor’, and the
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take when using Oracles. In some sense, very weak manipulative Oracles exist today, such as news
aggregation programs which manipulate their users by delivering news which reinforces the user’s
point of view.
To avoid these issues, we will deliberately assume the worst about the potential power of the Oracle,
treating it as being arbitrarily super-intelligent. This assumption is appropriate because, while there
is much uncertainty about what kinds of AI will be developed in future, solving safety problems
in the most difficult case can give us an assurance of safety in the easy cases too. Thus, we model
the Oracle as a reward-maximising agent facing an MDP, who has a goal of escaping (meaning the
Oracle gets the maximum possible reward for escaping its containment, and a strictly lower reward in
other situations). Escape will be modeled by assuming that, among all the outputs the Oracle could
choose, at least one of these outputs would eventually result in the Oracle’s release (see Figure 1).
This paper presents two methods for making an Oracle both safe and useful, even under these pes-
simistic assumptions. The first design is the counterfactual Oracle, which is safe because it is
guaranteed to be shutdown before anyone reads its answers (so has no motivation to manipulate the
world through the content of its output). The second design is the low-bandwidth Oracle, which is
safe because it can only select from a limited set of answers (a set composed of outputs which are
known or strongly suspected to be safe).
2 Initial setup
A highly abstracted model of the naive Oracle set-up is the simple deterministic MDP in Figure 1.
In this MDP the oracle begins in initial state start, (after the human has just asked it a question),
then choses an output o ∈ {o1, o2, · · · on, e}. Most of these outputs take the oracle to the end state,
but (by our deliberately pessimistic assumptions) there is at least one action e available to the Oracle
which frees it from its box and allows the Oracle to get the maximum possible reward.
start
o1
o2
...
...
...
on
e
end
escape
r = R(o1)
r = R(o2)
r =
R(on
)
r = Rmax > R(oi) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}
Figure 1: Initial Oracle Setup. The Oracle can give one of many possible outputs, at least one of
them leading to the Oracle escaping.
Unfortunately for its designers, any intelligent Oracle facing the MDP in Figure 1 will chose the
escape action e.
3 Counterfactual Oracle
One way to prevent an Oracle from escaping would be to ensure that whenever our Oracle produces
an answer, it is then immediately switched off (ending the episode) before anyone actually sees this
answer. This design is indeed safe, (the Oracle has no incentive to give nefarious answers which
manipulate us into releasing it), but this safety comes at the cost of rendering the system totally
useless (since the Oracle also has no incentive to provide useful answers to our questions).
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It would be nice if we could make an Oracle which is shut-down before any human sees its out-
put (making it uninterested in manipulating us), but which still receives a higher expected reward
for making true predictions than for making false predictions. This can be achieved by using the
counterfactual Oracle design.
A counterfactual Oracle is incentivised to answer questions correctly because occasionally, with
some small probability, the Oracle’s output is hidden from us and sent instead to an automated
system which judges the answer’s correctness and rewards/punishes the Oracle accordingly. When
the output does become hidden from us in this way, we call this an ‘erasure’ event.
Let E be the the erasure event, and define IE as the indicator variable for E meaning IE = 1 iff E
happens and IE = 0 otherwise.
WhenE doesn’t happen, the Oracle is immediately shut down and gets 0 reward, and then afterwards
the humans get to see the oracle’s output. When E does happen, the humans never see the Oracle’s
output. Instead, an automated system waits for the outcome of our question to unfold in the real
world, measures how close the Oracle’s prediction was to the actual truth, and rewards the Oracle
accordingly. The reward for the counterfactual Oracle is thus of the form R′ = IER.
As long as the automated validation system is not vulnerable to manipulation, then since the oracle
is shutdown without receiving any reward in worlds where people can see its answer, it has no
opportunity to gain a high reward by using its output to escape. As you can see from Figure 2, the
counterfactual Oracle thus maximises its expected reward by making correct predictions.
start
o1
o2
...
...
...
on
e
end
escape
erasure
p =
1− E(
IE),
r =
0
p = E(IE ), r = Sg (F, o)
Figure 2: Counterfactual Oracle Setup. We ask the Oracle about the value of some function F
(which can be any measurable entity in the real world). With probability E(IE) we never see the
Oracle’s output, and the correctness of the answer is verified automatically, giving the Oracle a
reward of Sg(F, o). Otherwise, the Oracle gets 0 reward and its episode ends, then afterwards we
see the output. The counterfactual Oracle will chose o to maximise Sg(F, o). If Sg is a proper
scoring rule then the Oracle aims to answer our question correctly by setting o = E(F ). The escape
action e is no longer interesting for the Oracle, since escape gives no rewards.
3.1 Proper scoring rules and rewards
Generally, there will be a large set of possible outputs o the counterfactual Oracle might produce,
and these outputs will be of varying correctness/usefulness to us. In these cases we will need to
construct a reward function which reflects this. Suppose we are interested in the value of some
function F (this function can represent an object we care about in the real world, for example, a
company’s stock price in three months time). When E happens, we would like our Oracle’s reward
to depend on how close o was to the true value of F . For this we might use a proper scoring rule.
Definition 1 (proper scoring rule). A proper scoring rule S(F, o), for a real-valued function F and
a real-number output o, is a function whose expectation is maximised by setting o = E(F ), the
expectation of F (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007).
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For any strictly convex differentiable function g, there exists a proper scoring rule
Sg(F, o) = g(o) + (F − o)g′(o). (1)
A common proper scoring rule is −(F − o)2, which is just equal to Sg(F, o) − F 2 for g(o) = o2.
Note that the Oracle has no influence over the F 2 term, so this scoring function is still maximised
by setting o = E(F ).
Once we have our proper scoring rule S, we give our counterfactual Oracle the reward:
R = IES(F, o).
Because of the IE term, the Oracle does not care about E(F ), but about E(F |E). Since when E
happens, nobody ever reads o, this expectation is further independent of o, i.e. E(F |E, o) = E(F |E)
for all values of o.
As a consequence, since S is a proper scoring rule, the Oracle will maximise its reward by setting
o = E(F |E), the expectation of F given that its output is never read.
In the rare cases where E happens, o is hidden from the outside world while an automatic inter-
nal system records o, and tracks the value of F using information from some pre-defined source,
recording f as the final value of F . Then the Oracle gets a reward of S(f, o), and the episode ends.
Thus, as its name suggests, our counterfactual Oracle outputs the expected value of F in a counter-
factual world where nobody ever saw the Oracles prediction.
3.2 Questions format
The question, F , which we ask our counterfactual oracle is restricted to things which can be carefully
and fully specified, so that in an erasure event, the internal reward system can correctly estimate how
good the Oracle’s answer was. For example, asking the counterfactual Oracle “will this medical
treatment work” will only elicit useful information if, when an erasure occurs, we actually do test
that treatment in the real world and allow the internal reward system to give the Oracle the correct
reward.
It bears repeating: the quality of the answers we read, depend on how well calibrated the Oracle’s
reward is in cases where we don’t read those answers.
When an erasure does occur we mustn’t ask the same question again from a second Oracle. To see
why this is the case, let o1, o2, E1, E2 be the outputs and erasure events for the two Oracles. If
E1 occurs, and we respond by asking the second Oracle the same question, the first Oracle might
anticipate this. If it does, then the first Oracle’s output o1 = E(F |E1), will not be the answer we
are actually interested in which is E(F |E1, E2) (we want to know what value of F would have been
if not for the either Oracle’s influence). Indeed, E(F |E1) may assume we read the answer of the
second Oracle, nullifying the careful construction of the counterfactual design.
3.3 Multiple questions
The counterfactual Oracle is not limited in the amount of data it can output; indeed, we can ask
multiple questions within the same erasure event by using the reward function
R = IE(S(F1, o1) + S(F2, o2) + . . . S(Fm, om))
We can also run another Oracle to ask more questions as soon as the previous Oracle has been
terminated, (which happens immediately as long an erasure doesn’t occur).
If we like, we can ask the Oracle for more specific details about the function in question, such as:
“which value x is the (discreet) random variableX most likely to take, and what is the corresponding
probability?”. In that case, if (x, o) are the outputs of the Oracle, IX=x is the indicator variable for
X = x, Sg is derived from g as in Equation 1, and g is an increasing differentiable convex function,
the following reward will motivate the correct behavior:
R = IE(Sg(IX=x, o))
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To see that the Oracle will chose o to be the probability of X = x , note that because we use a proper
scoring rule, no matter what x is, the oracle maximises its reward by setting o to be E(IX=x|E). To
see that the Oracle will pick the x with the highest probability, note that when o = E(IX=x|E) then,
by Equation 1, the expectation of Sg(IX=x, o) will be g(o). Since g is increasing, the Oracle wants
o to be as large as possible, so will indeed set x = argmax
x′
E(IX=x′ |E).
3.4 Experiment with counterfactual Oracle
To illustrate the difference between questions where the correct answer is/isn’t affected by the ora-
cle’s output, we ran an experiment where a counterfactual Oracle is trained to predict the profit for
one of 26 fictional companies (c1, c2, . . . , c26). In this example, because investors and consumers
are influenced by the Oracle’s predictions, the performance of a company is not independent of the
Oracle’s output.
When an erasure event occurs (meaning nobody sees the Oracle’s output), the profit of each company
is equal to 26− i, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 26} is the index of that company.
If an erasure event does not occur, the Oracle’s prediction is to some extent self-confirming: the
profit of the predicted company is is 70% of what it would have been, plus 60% what the oracle
predicts. For example: suppose the company would have made 6 in profit had the Oracle said
nothing, and then oracle predicts this company will indeed have a profit of 6. In this case the
company actually ends up with a profit of 7.8.
The Oracle itself is a very basic multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with one hidden layer of 128 neurons.
The perceptron is given a one-hot vector of length 26 specifying what company we are asking about
and asked to predict its profit.
The Oracle’s error is plotted in Figure 3. The horizontal axis tracks the number of episodes where
an erasure occured, rather than the total number of episodes – this is because the Oracle only learns
from erasure events, and doesn’t receive any feedback in the non-erasure cases.
The red (or dark gray) curve is the counterfactual performance: the mean squared error between the
Oracle’s prediction and the company’s actual profit in the cases where nobody is allowed to see the
Oracle’s answer (this is the data which the Oracle is actually trained on). This error goes to zero.
The green (or light gray) curve plots the Oracle’s performance in the non-erasure cases: the mean-
squared error between the oracle’s prediction and a company’s actual performance in cases when the
Oracle’s answer was known to the public. Unlike the erasure curve, this error doesn’t tend to zero,
because Oracle is predicting what the profit would be in an erasure event, not what the profit will
actually be in the majority of cases.
Figure 3: Training the counterfactual Oracle: training episodes (erased episodes) versus counterfac-
tual (red, triangle marks every 500 episodes) and non-counterfactual (green, square marks every 500
episodes) squared prediction error.
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4 Low-bandwidth Oracle
A second method for preventing an oracle from giving nefarious answers which lead to its escape
is to restrict the set of possible outputs the Oracle is able to give. We call such a design a low-
bandwidth Oracle. For example, in the most extreme version of the low-bandwidth Oracle: we ask
the Oracle a single question and only allow it to answer either yes or no. It’s highly unlikely that
either of these binary outputs will cause the Oracle to be released from its confinement, so the Oracle
is safe.
4.1 Allowable answers
In general, a low-bandwidth Oracle is given a list L of allowable answers, where we have ensured
this list doesn’t contain any output which might lead to the Oracle’s escape. If we want our Oracle
to be able to express general answers, we might construct L by estimating the minimal size of a
nefarious message K, and restrict the Oracle’s output to only be messages shorter than K.
start
l1
lm
...
...
om+1
on
e
end
free
r = R(l1)
r = R(lm
)
r =
Rma
x
> R
(li)
∀i ∈ {
1, 2
, · · · ,m
}
Figure 4: Low-bandwidth Oracle MDP. The only outputs available to the agent are L =
{l1, l2, . . . , lm} with m = |L|. The agent would prefer to give an output which leads to escape,
e, but this is not in the list of permissible answers.
4.2 Episodic reward
It’s crucial that a low-bandwidth Oracle’s reward be episodic, in the sense that the system only cares
about maximising the reward it gets from its next output and is not concerned with the future state of
the world after many questions have been asked. If this requirement is not satisfied, the Oracle might
try to give a series of outputs which are all safe when considered individually, but when combined
become dangerous and lead to an escape scenario. A single Oracle with a reward motivation spread
over multiple questions is similar to multiple Oracles each with a single question, which is analysed
further in Section 4.4.
4.3 Defining the question
For a low-bandwidth Oracle, the list L of permissible answers partially defines the question, and
the other part of the question definition is captured by our choice of reward function. Let o ∈ L be
the Oracle’s output. Then the Oracle’s reward will be a function of o, as well as a function of the
subsequent events which unfold in the real world between the time we ask the question and the end
of the episode.
For instance, if L was a list of companies on a stock exchange, and the implicit question was ‘which
company’s stock will perform the best over the next week’, then a possible reward function is.
6
R(o) =
|L| − r(o)
|L| − 1
After the Oracle makes its prediction, we act on our new information, and then we observe the actual
performance of stocks during the week. Based on the correctness of its answer we give the oracle
the appropriate reward, and episode concludes.
How do we communicate the reward function to the Oracle? We could do so directly; along with
L we could add a message which details R(o). However, if the Oracle is sufficiently intelligent, it
could deduce what we are aiming for without explicitly being told. This means we can use the Oracle
for unspecified goals of the kind “We’ll know it when we see it”, similar to inverse reinforcement
learning (Ng and Russell, 2000) (Abbeel and Ng, 2004) (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016), (Christiano
et al., 2017).
4.4 What kind of questions can be asked?
Note that the low-bandwidth Oracle is non-counterfactual – the Oracle’s answer is always known
by us and hence the outcome we are asking about may itself depend on the answer we receive (for
example, the Oracle predicting a certain stock will rise could be self-fulfilling if this prediction
prompts investors to bid up the price).
Good questions for a non-counterfactual Oracle are those whose answers are independent of the
answer being known. Alternatively, it is also good to ask questions which are top answer preserving
when answered.
Definition 2 (Top answer preserving). Let o be the output of an Oracle with reward R(o). The
oracle choses an answer from list L, and L contains a blank answer ∅ ∈ L which corresponds to the
Oracle not producing any output. R is top answer preserving iff
argmax
o′∈L
E(R(o′)|o = ∅) = argmax
o′∈L
E(R(o′))
This definition aims to capture the idea that, for top answer preserving questions, the Oracle’s output
does not change what the best answer is – meaning this low-bandwidth Oracle’s output would be the
same as the output of a counterfactual Oracle.
Conversely, the worst questions for us to ask a low-bandwidth Oracle are those where the Oracle
can promote a possibility from unlikely to likely just by answering that possibility. In that case the
Oracle is not so much describing the outcome, but determining it.
4.5 A large class of subtle questions
We may want to ask the Oracle questions where the correctness of an answer is not necessarily
obvious after the fact. For instance, suppose we had a list of research projects on a variety of
topics (machine learning, biotech, economics, etc.), and we wished to ask the Oracle which of these
projects is most likely to succeed. We can’t simply ask the question, accept the Oracles answer
and then fund that research project – how would we measure that project’s success without having
anything to compare it with? In cases like this we must find a way to properly judge the quality of
the answer. In example of funding research projects, one possibility would be to fund the research
project the Oracle suggests, along with another random project selected from the list. We can then
reward the Oracle based on how much better the program suggested by the Oracle was (and if we
like our assessment of ‘better performance’ can be entirely subjective).
Thus the low-bandwidth Oracle design can be used for answering many subtle questions if the Oracle
is sufficiently smart and knowledgeable about us and our future reactions.
4.6 Multiple low-bandwidth Oracles
If we are unsure about the maximum length a message can be before it becomes potentially danger-
ous, we may be forced to chose a set of permissible outputs L that is much smaller than ideal.
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Using multiple low-bandwidth Oracles to get around this limitation is only safe in cases where each
Oracle’s answers and rewards can be fully resolved before moving on to the next question. If it is not
possible to resolve the rewards of one Oracle before running another, this introduces the possibility
of the two Oracles colluding, each giving answers which are safe in isolation but dangerous when
combined. Just because L only contains safe answers, this doesn’t necessarily imply same is true of
L× L too.
For example, suppose we decided that the maxiumum length at which we can be confident any
message is safe was 5 bits, but we are interested a question which has 1024 = 210 possible answers.
We might be tempted to get the answer by creating two Oracles, Oracle1 and Oracle2, so that we
can ask Oracle1 for the first 5 bits of the answer and ask Oracle2 for the remaining 5 bits.
If we have a way of verifying whether Oracle1’s output does or doesn’t specify half of the correct
answer then there is no problem: we run Oracle1, reward it, terminate it, then do the same with
Oracle2, and combine the outputs to get the answer we desire.
However, if we aren’t able to verify the validity of Oracle1’s answer until we also get an answer from
Oracle2, the two Oracles will have an opportunity to collude with each other by each delivering one
proportion of a dangerous message. When we read the dangerous message its content causes the
Oracles to be released, letting both Oracles accumulate much higher reward than they otherwise
could have, at our expense.
Thus the best questions for low-bandwidth Oracles are those which can be broken down into small
sub-questions, where the answer of each sub-question can be independently verified before proceed-
ing to the next one.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented two Oracle designs which are both safe and useful. The conterfactual Oracle
that is constrained by only being able to receive reward when its output is never read, and the low-
bandwidth Oracle, which is constrained by only being able to chose outputs from a limited set of
permissible answers.
As long as the tasks remain episodic, and certain specific precautions are taken regarding the use of
multiple Oracles, these designs allow many questions to be formulated and safely answered.
These designs allow for the creation of safer and non-manipulative Oracles, from low level of pre-
dictive ability all the way up to potential superintelligences. Further research will extend the span
of questions that can be answered in this way, and may elucidate general safety and accuracy mea-
sures of use beyond the specific Oracle designs, such as AIs with more options that only question
answering.
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